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Exchange to have deprived petitioner of "fair procedures," thus impliedly
placing a duty on exchanges to observe due process requirements.
In addition to injunctive relief, a strong position could be urged that
petitioner is entitled to damages for breach of the Exchange's duty to afford
due process to an aggrieved party. 32
 Further, there are available the com-
mon law remedies for tortious interference with contractual relations and
wrongful harm without reasonable cause, both of which were included in
petitioner's original declaration. 33
The above alternatives are all predicated upon the assumption that the
Exchange's rule falls within the scope of its statutory duty of self-regulation.
There are other remedies available but it is submitted that antitrust law
and its severe treble damage sanctions is not properly included therein.
JOSEPH J. REARDON
Bankruptcy—Equity vs. State Law in Bankruptcy Courts.—In the Mat-
ter of Harold Laskin, Bankrupt. 1—Laskin, prior to filing a voluntary peti-
tion in bankruptcy, executed a promissory note on which he signed the name
of the corporation of which he was president and his own name. 2 There
was no indication that Laskin's signature appeared in a representative
capacity. The payee subsequently filed a proof of claim and was listed
among scheduled claims, and, upon allegations of fraud, objected to bank-
rupt's discharge. Bankrupt filed exceptions to these objections and received
permission to delete the payee from the list of creditors on the grounds that
the payee was a creditor of the corporation only, not of Laskin personally.
Upon a hearing on the status of the payee the referee found, on the basis of
parol evidence, that at the time of the execution of the note it was intended
that Laskin sign only in a representative capacity, and, hence, that the payee
was not his creditor and lacked standing to object to the discharge. The
district court reverse& holding that the controlling law was the Pennsylvania
Uniform Commercial Code. Parol evidence was inadmissible to show Laskin's
representative capacity.* The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. HELD:
32 See note 29 supra.
33 Supra note 4.
1 316 F.2d 70 (3d Cir. 1963).
2 Laskin Bros. of Phila. Inc. Harold Laskin. For a discussion of the signature rule
under the UCC and examples thereof see Willier and Hart, Forms and Procedures
Under The Uniform Commercial Code Q 32.07 (1963). See also Uniform Commercial
Code § 3-403(3) (1962 ed.).
3 204 F. Supp. 106 (ED. Pa. 1963). See annot., 4 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 108
(1963).
4 "An authorized representative who signs his own name to an instrument is also
personally obligated unless the instrument names the person represented and shows the
signature is made in a representative capacity." Pa. Stat. tit. I2A § 3-403 (1953). An
amendment to the Code which allows parol evidence to show the representative capacity
as between the immediate parties was in effect in Pennsylvania at the time of the court's
decision. Uniform Commercial Code § 3-403 (1958). The former provisions were in ef-
fect, however, at the date of the note's execution.
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however, that in the case now under discussion, it was not the statutory
sanction rule of the Exchange which was the subject matter of the litigation
but rather the factual application thereof. Consequently, the Court may quite
properly have determined that this was not an issue requiring expertise. Quite
another problem would have been raised had the rule itself been in issue.
However that may be, the wisdom of applying antitrust law and its
severe sanctions27
 may be seriously challenged in this type of situation. If
the Exchange acted improperly, that it should be held liable for any ensuing
damage thereby occasioned to the petitioner is a readily acceptable result.
But subjecting the Exchange to treble damage liability for action taken in
good faith pursuant to valid rules appears to be rather harsh and unwarranted.
The Court apparently felt that there was no other remedy available. How-
ever, it is submitted that injunctive relief was available by way of a peti-
tion couched in terms of deprivation of a valuable property right without
due process of law by an organization possessing a quasi-governmental
status, asserting that the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 impliedly gave
the Exchange this status.28 In Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co.,2°
the Court determined that a labor organization, acting as the exclusive
bargaining agent of employees pursuant to authority vested in it under the
Railway Labor Act," was subject to the constitutional limitations imposed
by the Fifth Amendment even though it was not a governmental agency.
In Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, the Court held that the transmission
of radio programs through receivers in its passenger vehicles by a street
railway corporation which operated under the regulatory supervision of the
Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia, an agency authorized
by Congress, sufficiently involved the federal government in the responsibility
for the radio programs so as to make the Fifth Amendment applicable. 3 '
These are two examples of the application of the Fifth Amendment to
private concerns wherein the Court found sufficient connection with the
federal government to impose constitutional limitations. It is submitted that
the statutorily imposed duty of Exchange self-regulation may also be an
adequate basis for asserting the application of the due process requirements
of the Fifth Amendment to exchanges. This proposition receives added sup-
port from the fact that the Court, in the Silver case, held the action of the
27 See note 5 supra.
28 The Act of 1934 places a statutory duty of self-regulation on all exchanges.
Supra note II.
29 323 U.S. 192, 207 (1944). Petitioner, a negro, was held to be entitled to equal
status and representation by the labor organization notwithstanding the Railway Labor
Act's conference upon the labor organization of the power to create and restrict rights
of those whom it represented. The Court construed the Act as imposing a duty on the
union to represent and bargain for all the members of a craft regardless of race. The
Act itself provided no express means for administrative remedy but the Court held
that it "contemplates resort to the usual judicial remedies of injunction and award of
damages when appropriate for breach of that (statutory] duty."
39 48 Stat. 1185 (1936), 45 U.S.C. 151 et seq. (1958).
31 343 U.S. 451 (1952). Petitioner, who was a regular passenger on the vehicles of
the street railway, sought to prohibit the playing of music, contending that it was an
invasion of his right to privacy. The Court held that the First and Fifth Amendments were
properly available to the petitioner, but dismissed on other grounds.
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Bankruptcy courts are essentially courts of equity and the referee properly
considered all the evidence available pursuant to the equitable distribution
of bankrupt's estate .°
The precise location of the line separating equity in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings and state law has evaded both discovery by legal commentators
and court definition.0 The holding in the Laskin case appears to conceal
this location beneath an even heavier veil while suggesting that it lies farther
beyond the boundaries of state law than had previously been believed. A
number of cases were cited by the court to support its holding, but an ex-
amination of these cases reveals that the broad language of equity powers
stated therein was rendered in the context of rather narrowly restricted
factual situations. Whether they were intended to extend to situations like
the one presented in the Laskin case is dubious.
In Vanston Committee v. Green? the Supreme Court held that a claim
in bankruptcy for interest upon interest, whether or not valid under state law,
was inconsistent with established equitable principles of bankruptcy and,
therefore, violative of the Bankruptcy Act itself. The case of Prudence
Realization Corp. v. Geists presented the question of the subordination of
the claims of an insolvent defaulting guarantor of certificates of participation
in a mortgage who was also the owner of part of the mortgage indebtedness.
While explicitly stating that state law did not control, the Court held, again
on the basis of affirmative federal precedent, that to allow the guarantor a
pro rata share with other creditors would be contrary to the purpose of the
indemnity and inconsistent with bankruptcy principles. Pepper v. Litton?
often cited as the leading case recognizing the broad equity power of referees
in bankruptcy, involved the claim of a controlling stockholder of a bankrupt
corporation. The Court sustained the disallowance of the claim because of
the referee's finding that it was made pursuant to a scheme to defraud other
creditors and that it constituted a breach of a fiduciary duty owed by the
claimant to other creditors.
These cases, it is obvious, were decided upon the equitable powers of
bankruptcy but the factual situation in each one is very distinct from that
of the Laskin case. In only one of the aforementioned cases, Vanston, was
there a right created under state law which the Court denied on equitable
grounds, as such, and this decision rested on previously defined principles
of bankruptcy derived from the Court's interpretation of the Bankruptcy
Act. In Prudence, the Court was confronted with a legal right the exercise
of which, because of the indemnity issue, would create an inequitable rela-
tionship among the other creditors. The Pepper decision was rendered from
the context of circumstances suggesting fraud and a breach of a fiduciary
5 Upon remand the district court was directed to review the allegations of fraud
made by the payee.
See, Hill, "The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy," 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1013 (1953);
3 Collier, Bankruptcy (14th ed. 1961) § 63.03; IA Moore's Fed. Practice (2d ed.
1961) §' 0.322.
7 329 U.S. 156 (1946).
8 316 U.S. 89 (1942).
9 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
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obligation. On the other hand, the only fraud suggested in Laskin has been
alleged by the payee; no fiduciary obligation is running nor would an
inequitable status be granted the payee by recognizing Laskin's obligation
on the note. Nor does any well-established federal precedent obtain here.
No equitable principle supports the rewriting of state law by referees—
which is what the court in Laskin, in effect, did. Moreover, along with the
language of "equity" pronounced by the Court was an affirmance of the
role of state law in bankruptcy proceedings. "What claims of creditors are
valid and subsisting obligations against the bankrupt at the time the petition
in bankruptcy is filed is a question which, in the absence of overruling
federal law, is to be determined by reference to state law." 10 (Emphasis
supplied.) Also, bankruptcy courts should proceed "not without appropriate
regard for rights acquired under state law."11 It has been explicitly held
by the Supreme Court that a claim valid under state law cannot be modified
or ignored in equity no matter how harsh or oppressive the terms of the
obligation may appear to the federal court.' 2
The holding in the Laskin case certainly runs counter to the "one
fundamental principle that pervades our system of bankruptcy liquidation,
namely that validity or non-validity of a claim is and should be ascertained
in the light of state law that would be applicable in the absence of bankruptcy
proceedings."" Faced with a choice between two enunciated principles of
the Supreme Court, the court here chose to rely on the grant of equitable
powers. It is submitted, on the other hand, that, as earlier suggested, the cases
cited do not support the finding and that certainly no "overruling federal
law" was here involved. The Bankruptcy Act itself contains no mandate in
this regard;" the court's holding is, rather, an extension of the prior
holdings far beyond that which was probably intended.' 5
However, several factors must be noted which, undoubtedly, exercised
considerable influence on the court and strongly colored its decision. To begin
with, the court was presented with the evidence and finding of the referee
that the parties had not intended personal liability of Laskin when the note
was executed. In addition, the majority rule was that parol evidence was
admissible as between the immediate parties to establish the representative
capacity of the signer and this was the Pennsylvania rule before the Code's
10 Vanston Committee v. Green, supra note 7, at 161.
11 Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726, 732 (1946).
12 Manufacturers' Fin. Co. v. McKey, 294 U.S. 442, 448 (1935). In the same opinion
the Court quoted with approval from a Pennsylvania decision: "Legal rights are as
safe in chancery as they are in a court of law, and however strong an appeal may be
to the conscience of a chancellor for equitable relief, he is powerless to grant it if the
one from whom it must come will be deprived of a legal right." 294 U.S. at 449.
Colonial Trust Co. v. Central Trust Co., 243 Pa. 268 at 276, 90 Atl. 189 at 191 (1914).
13 3 Collier, Bankruptcy, op. cit. supra note 6.
14 "Courts of bankruptcy are created . . . and invested . . . with such jurisdiction
at law and equity as will enable them to exercise original jurisdiction . . . to allow
claims, disallow claims...." Bankruptcy Act 2(a), 52 Stat. 842 (1938), 11 US.C. 11
(1958). This is the extent of the Act's grant of equity jurisdiction. The extent of the
powers thus granted is a matter of court interpretation.
15 For a discussion of the extent of the equity powers of a referee in bankruptcy
see Hill, supra note 6.
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adoption. Furthermore, the Code did provide for the admission of parol
evidence for the purpose of reformation, a fact noted by the court?"' Finally,
the Code had been amended in Pennsylvania by the time of the litigation to
permit parol evidence in the same type situation. The weight of all these
factors was probably a determining element.
For yet another substantial reason, the decision appears to be inconsistent
with those cases on which it purports to rely. Each case cited by the court
for support dealt with the question of the allowability of certain claims.
The Laskin holding determined the creditor status of the payee on the note
or the provability of the claim. The distinction is crucial; the discharge of
Laskin will not affect the payee's claim against him in subsequent proceed-
ings. 17
 It is upon the allowance of claims that equity heretofore had been
called to judge. In Laskin the court employed equity to determine the
validity or existence of a claim and was without precedent in this respect.
It is precisely in the area of the validity of a claim that state law is critical
and, of necessity, controlling. The Bankruptcy Act provides that "a proof
of claim shall consist of a statement under oath, in writing and signed by
a creditor... . "18
 No standard is available in the Act to determine the validity
of a claim. The only determinant is obtained by recourse to the pertinent
state law. No other standard exists. Certainly not some vague and undefined
principles of federal equity. The Bankruptcy Act itself refers to equity only
in respect to the allowance of claims." Furthermore, that state law is
controlling on the question of the existence of claims is evident from several
recent decisions.2° And, according to the state law applicable in the Laskin
case, a valid claim against him did exist.
In summary, it is concluded that the holding in the Laskin case lacks
support of prior decisions and is contrary to the general rule that state
law determines the validity of contracts executed under those laws. The
provisions of the Bankruptcy Act conferring equitable jurisdiction on
bankruptcy courts deal with the allowance of claims, not their validity. The
Act provides no authority for the decision here. The case stands alone in
the long line of bankruptcy decisions. If it is followed it will precipitate
16 In the Matter of Harold Laskin, Bankrupt, supra note 1, at 75.
17 "A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable
debts... ." Bankruptcy Act § 17(a), 74 Stat. 409 (1960), 11 U.S.C. § 35(a) (Supp. IV
1959-62). The distinction is evident from the terms of the Act itself and has been treated
at length in Collier, op. cit. supra note 6, § 63.05, and in In re Hornstein, 122 Fed. 266,
274 (N.D.N.Y. 1903), "A claim must be proved before it can be allowed. .. ." See also,
9 Am. Jur. 2d Bankruptcy § 428 (1963).
18 Bankruptcy Act § 57(a), 74 Stat. 217 (1960), 11 U.S.C. § 93(a) (Supp. IV
1959-62).
10 Bankruptcy Act § 57(k), 52 Stat. 866 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 93(k) (1958). See also
Collier, op. cit. supra note 6, § 63.06(5); 9 Am. Jur. 2d, op. cit. supra note 17, Bankruptcy
§ 430.
20 Hulsart v. Hooper, 274 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1960) (Alaska law determines
validity of mortgage); In re Alikasovich, 275 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1960), (Michigan
law determines validity of chattel mortgage). The principle is succinctly stated in In
re American Metals Prods. Co., 276 F.2d 701, 705 (2d Cir. 1960): "A federal court
may not deflect or defeat the force of that enactment [by the Conn. Legislature] by
applying an equitable doctrine where the statute does not leave room for interstitial
judicial legislation."
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a return to a theory "that all transactions underlying claims in bankruptcy
would, in effect, be subject to federal review in the light of overriding
federal commercial law,"21 a concept already rejected in Erie v. Tompkins. 22
W. JOSEPH ENGLER, JR.
Guaranty—Partial Failure of Consideration in the Principal Contract—
Pro Tanto Defense for the Guarantor.—Walcutt v. Clevite Corfr. 1—
ln February of 1959, the plaintiffs sold their holdings in several corpora-
tions to the Clevite Corporation. They also agreed in separate assignable
writings not to compete with Clevite for a period of ten years, during which
time Clevite was to remunerate them in equal quarter-annual instalments.
In September, 1960, Clevite sold both the assets of the plaintiffs' former
corporations and the agreements not to compete to Walco Electronics Com-
pany. As part of the bargain, Walco promised Clevite that it would pay the
plaintiffs their regular instalments; moreover, Richmond, the president and
sole shareholder of Walco, guaranteed Clevite that he would pay if Walco
did not. The payments not forthcoming, the plaintiffs sued Clevite directly
on the noncompetition agreements. They also, as third party beneficiaries
of Richmond's guaranty to Clevite, sued Richmond. Walco was not served.
Richmond answered, inter alia, that Clevite had grossly exaggerated the
value of the assets sold to Walco, that Walco's agreement to pay the plain-
tiffs was thus obtained by fraud, and that because of such fraud on Walco,
he, Richmond, should be freed from his obligations as Walco's guarantor.
Special Term granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs against
both defendants, and to Clevite on its crossclaim against Richmond. Ap-
pellate Division affirmed. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals, in concluding
that the summary judgments against Richmond must be reversed, HELD:
First, that although Richmond's defense of fraud upon Walco was unavail-
ing as a matter of law, nevertheless, sufficient facts had been pleaded to
support a pro tanto defense which had not been pressed, namely partial fail-
ure of consideration in the Walco-Clevite contract; and second, that since
Richmond and Walco were "truly one and the same," that Richmond should
be deemed to have had the implied consent of Walco to assert against the
plaintiffs Walco's claim of fraud against Clevite.
In New York, it has long been the rule that a surety 2 when sued alone
cannot defend by showing that his principal was defrauded by the creditor
21 Hill, supra note 6, at 1013.
22 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
1 13 N.Y.2d 48, 191 N.E.2d 894 (1963).
2 Richmond is in fact a guarantor and not a surety as strictly defined. Accord-
ingly, his obligation is secondary, that is, conditioned upon the default of Walco.
Nevertheless, since the term surety is often broadly used to indicate any responsibility
for the debt of another and since the legal consequences in the instant case are the
same whether Richmond is a surety or guarantor, this writer has chosen for the sake of
simplicity and clarity of expression to use the term surety even when technically incorrect.
For distinction between surety and guarantor, see Simpson, Suretyship H 3-6
(1950).
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